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Behavioral Economics

Sources: Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0) ยท Kahneman & Tversky (1979), Prospect Theory

People are not rational maximizers. Prospect theory replaces expected utility with a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper on the loss side. Behavioral economics catalogs the systematic ways humans deviate from the rational-agent model.

The value function

wpKahneman and wpTversky's value function has three properties. Reference dependence: outcomes are evaluated as gains or losses relative to a reference point, not absolute levels. Diminishing sensitivity: the function is concave for gains and convex for losses. Loss aversion: losses hurt roughly twice as much as equivalent gains feel good (the coefficient lambda is typically around 2.25).

outcome value gains losses reference steeper (loss aversion) concave (diminishing)
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Loss aversion and framing

Loss aversion means people reject gambles that a rational agent would accept. A 50-50 bet to win $110 or lose $100 has positive expected value, but most people decline. Framing changes decisions by relabeling the same outcome: "90% survival rate" versus "10% mortality rate" triggers different choices despite identical information.

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Anchoring and nudges

Anchoring: initial exposure to a number biases subsequent estimates toward that number, even when it is irrelevant. Asking "Is the population of Chicago more or less than 10 million?" yields higher estimates than anchoring at 1 million. Nudges exploit these biases for good: changing default options (opt-out vs opt-in for retirement savings) dramatically changes behavior without restricting choice. This is libertarian paternalism.

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Cross-references

  • Cogsci Ch.6 โ€” decision making: the cognitive architecture behind biases

Foundations (Wikipedia)