💎 Auction Theory
Derivatives of 
june.kim/vector-space (CC BY-SA 4.0). Original papers linked for each.
Papers
| Paper | One sentence | |
|---|---|---|
| Vickrey 1961 | Second-price sealed-bid: truthful bidding is a dominant strategy | 💎 |
| Clarke 1971 + Groves 1973 | VCG mechanism: each winner pays the externality they impose | 💎 |
| Edelman, Ostrovsky, Schwarz 2007 | GSP is not truthful but has efficient equilibria. Google used it anyway | 💎 |
| Milgrom & Weber 1982 | Affiliated values and the linkage principle: transparency raises revenue | 💎 |
| Aurenhammer 1987 | Power diagrams partition space with weighted sites | 💎 |
| Lahaie & Lubin 2025 | VCG allocation as a linear program; the LP dual gives prices | 💎 |
| Hartline, Hoy, Taggart 2023 | Reserve pricing preserves competitive efficiency | 💎 |
| Hajiaghayi et al. 2024 | RAG-based ad insertion into LLM responses | 💎 |
Derivative of june.kim/vector-space (CC BY-SA 4.0). Original papers linked for each.
📺 Video lectures: Stanford CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory (Roughgarden)
Neighbors
- 🎲 Game Theory — auctions are mechanism design problems
- 💰 Economics — market design and equilibrium
- 🎰 Probability — bidder distributions and revenue calculations
- 📐 Linear Algebra — VCG as a linear program
- june.kim/buying-space-not-keywords — why keyword auctions are giving way to embedding-space auctions